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I. INTRODUCTION 
Chris Sagers’s book, Apple, Antitrust, and Irony, does a beautiful 
job of interweaving several histories that provide wonderful context to 
the Apple e-books antitrust case. In addition to chronicling the recent 
history of Apple and the major publishers’ efforts to combat Amazon 
in the e-book market, Sagers explains how the publishers’ complaints 
in the e-books case were reminiscent of arguments they have been 
making about the book industry for over a century. He then overlays 
this history with a brief history of the role of antitrust in American 
history.  
Sagers is a wonderful storyteller. His narrative is both rich in 
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come away from this book with a much deeper understanding of the 
book industry, the role of antitrust in American society, and the 
relationship between the two. In addition, Sagers makes the very 
important point that while nearly everyone in our recent history extols 
the virtues of a competitive marketplace in general, there is often a 
great deal of ambivalence about competition in particular cases. This 
point is important because, for the most part, these particular 
objections to competition are self-serving. By making clear that we 
have seen these objections continually throughout our history, Sagers 
reminds us to be wary when industries suggest that their case is 
different. 
While this message is an important one, in my view, Sagers pushes 
it too far. Markets and competition are complicated. While we can 
safely say that garden-variety price fixing is almost always detrimental 
to consumers and society, most antitrust questions do not have such 
easy answers. Particular market or production characteristics can 
make a big difference in whether many types of conduct are anti-
competitive or pro-competitive. This means that to ensure a 
reasonable level of accuracy, there is no substitute for detailed, case-
by-case, adjudication of the conduct in question. The quest for simple 
rules or relying heavily on precedent or labels will almost certainly 
lead to either substantially less deterrence of harmful conduct or more 
chilling of benign conduct (or both) than we could get by committing 
to undertake a detailed, careful analysis of most cases that go to trial. 
Where I disagree with Sagers in his book and where I will focus most 
of my comments, is where he makes broad claims about the 
desirability of certain antitrust rules or broad criticisms about the 
utility of modern, nuanced theories of markets or competition.  
II. AGAINST SIMPLICITY 
Antitrust is complicated. Outside of naked price fixing or market 
division, there are plausible pro-competitive arguments, at least in 
some circumstances, for almost all conduct that can also be anti-
competitive. That doesn’t mean that conduct is always, or even 
usually, desirable. It just means that blanket prohibitions will chill a 
great deal of desirable conduct. As a result, the United States’ antitrust 
laws have, sensibly, scaled back on many of the per se rules that used 
to dominate antitrust cases. There are many examples of this, of which 
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prohibition against resale price maintenance (“RPM”) is just the latest 
example. Since Sagers’s book has an extensive discussion of this issue, 
I will discuss this example in more detail later. Here, I will just 
provide a selection of other antitrust issues for which there are both 
plausible, at least in the abstract, pro- and anti-competitive 
arguments.  
Many other vertical arrangements, besides RPM, have credible 
pro- and anti-competitive arguments. Initially, courts were very 
skeptical of exclusive dealing contracts, especially by firms with 
significant market power.2 The Chicago school criticized the hostile 
view of exclusive dealing by making two points. The first is the basic 
Coasean argument that because exclusive dealing is a contract, a seller 
will only get a buyer to agree to an exclusive deal by providing the 
buyer with at least its reservation value from the contract. That is all 
the seller would have to provide without an exclusive deal as well. So, 
to the extent that exclusive dealing diminishes the buyer’s welfare 
relative to the non-exclusive deal, the seller must be offering a lower 
price that makes up for this loss. If she wasn’t, the seller would either 
not be able to get the buyer to agree or could have charged a higher 
price for the non-exclusive deal. Second, the Chicago school provided 
many reasons why exclusive dealing might encourage relationship-
specific investments or promote competition.3 This provided some 
rationale for why an exclusive deal might increase the joint value of 
the contract to the buyer and seller. 
While the Chicago school argued for an almost per se legal 
treatment for exclusive dealing, their two basic points did not justify 
such a conclusion. The second point suggests that rule of reason 
treatment may be appropriate, but the first point does not rule out 
anti-competitive exclusive dealing for two reasons. First, as later, 
more sophisticated, game theoretic models of vertical relationships 
showed, due to contracting externalities, an exclusive dealing contract 
in isolation could increase the joint welfare for a particular buyer and 
the seller but still hurt the welfare of buyers as a whole. As a result, it 
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4 See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. 
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addition, the Chicago school story assumes that the seller can always 
extract all the surplus from the buyer. But, if that is not the case, and 
the exclusive deal enables the seller to extract more of the surplus 
from the buyer for some reason (maybe by making its demand less 
elastic or providing some information rents) then it could be 
profitable for the seller even if it does not raise joint welfare. 
 It is important to note, however, that while these new models 
explained why we might see anti-competitive exclusive dealing, they 
did not overturn the potential pro-competitive benefits from exclusive 
dealing. That is, they provide guidance for courts for where to look for 
anti-competitive effects, but they do not guarantee that those anti-
competitive effects either explain any given instance of exclusive 
dealing or that those effects, where present, necessarily outweigh 
potential pro-competitive efficiencies. This is exactly the type of 
situation for which a robust rule of reason approach is optimal. The 
current literature makes clear that any other approach will risk either 
a substantial tolerance of anti-competitive exclusive dealing or a 
substantial chilling of efficiencies from pro-competitive exclusive 
dealing. 
A very similar story applies to tying. Tying, where a firm sells two 
distinct products together, has long been considered per se illegal.5 
Over the past few decades, however, the courts have gradually 
narrowed the scope of this per se prohibition as the potential 
efficiencies associated with tying become clear. In Jefferson Parrish,6 
the Court held that tying was only per se illegal if the tie really 
involved two separate products and if there was some anti-competitive 
forcing of consumers to purchase a product they otherwise did not 
wish to buy. In Microsoft,7 the DC Circuit, while accepting that tying is 
sometimes per se illegal, said that this prohibition should not extend 
to markets characterized by rapid innovation. 
The scholarly analysis of tying roughly parallels that of exclusive 
dealing. In the 1970s, the Chicago school’s one monopoly profit 
theorem argued that concerns about a dominant firm using tying to 
leverage its market power from one market to another was misguided. 
Instead, they argued that tying must be explained by efficiency 
                                                                                                                   
Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1305, 1307 
(2007). 
5 This began with Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394-96 (1947). 
6 Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-18 (1984). 
7 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 92-94 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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reasons, for which they provided several. Armed with game theoretic 
tools, economists later showed that the one monopoly profit 
argument, while an important baseline, held only under certain 
conditions.8 If, for example, the tied good was characterized by 
economies of scale, a tying arrangement could preclude an entrant in 
that market from having sufficient scale to effectively compete for 
consumers who only desired the tied product. Tying could also affect 
the competitive interaction in situations in which the goods were not 
perfect complements to make entry less attractive.9 Lastly, even when 
tying does not leverage monopoly power, it could be used to enable a 
dominant firm to extract more surplus from its monopoly, thereby 
hurting consumers and possibly reducing efficiency.10 It is important 
to note, however, that while these arguments effectively rebut the 
Chicago school claims that tying must be efficient, they do not suggest 
that the efficiency rationales for tying are baseless. Rather, what they 
indicate is that tying is a complicated issue for which it is easy to 
conceive of plausible pro- and anti-competitive effects which only a 
robust rule of reason can adequately sort out. 
Predatory pricing is another antitrust issue that should not be 
resolved by reference to simple rules. As I have written elsewhere,11 
proper analysis predatory pricing is necessarily complex. While the 
Court has attempted to streamline its analysis with the use of the two 
requirements of pricing below cost and recoupment, this approach 
only provides the illusion of simplicity while not accurately deterring 
harmful predation without chilling desirable competition. As Aaron 
Edlin has pointed out,12 there is no reason to think that above-cost 
predatory pricing is less damaging to competition than below-cost 





8 See, e.g., Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 
837, 837-39 (1990). 
9 Id. at 839; Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, 119 Q.J. ECON. 159, 161-62 
(2004). 
10 Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit 
Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 400-01 (2009). 
11 Abraham L. Wickelgren, The Necessary Complexity of Predatory Pricing Analysis: A 
Comment on Richard S. Markovits’s Treatment of Predatory Pricing in Economics and 
the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law, 61 ANTITRUST BULL. 
186, 197 (2016). 
12 Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941, 941-42 
(2002). 
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sustainable, thus more likely to actually force firms to exit. Louis 
Kaplow has noted that the recoupment requirement (that the 
dominant firm can likely recoup its losses from predation by earning 
supra-competitive profits in the future) doesn’t do a good job of 
distinguishing anti-competitive below cost pricing from pro-
competitive below cost pricing (e.g., promotional pricing or moving 
down the learning curve) because both are only rational if the firm can 
recoup those losses later.13 
The current approach to simplifying predatory pricing 
adjudication suffers from other, less remarked on, problems as well. 
While the requirement that a firm prices below cost was meant to 
reduce the problem of mistakenly chilling desirable competition, it 
might actually have the opposite effect. Note that the biggest concern 
about predatory pricing actions is that the threat of those actions will 
deter firms from lowering prices to compete aggressively. If costs can 
be measured perfectly, then the requirement that prices must be 
below cost would provide a safe harbor for firms to lower prices as 
long as they remained above costs. However, costs cannot be easily 
measured. As an example, the main issue in the AMR14 litigation was 
how to properly measure American Airlines’ costs on certain routes. 
This uncertainty means that there is no absolute safe harbor. Rather, 
the lower the price that a firm charges, the higher the probability that 
a court will find the price to be below cost. This can actually 
discourage a firm from aggressively lowering prices to compete with a 
rival. Moreover, as the AMR case demonstrates, it does so without 
necessarily easing the adjudication burden on the courts. 
What is needed, as was discussed above with reference to tying 
and exclusive dealing, is for courts to focus on addressing the 
fundamental, admittedly difficult, question in any antitrust case: is the 
pricing strategy on balance beneficial or harmful to competition or 
consumers? Using imperfect proxies such as pricing below cost and 
recoupment only leads to less accurate decisions, perverse incentives, 
and litigation expenses devoted to establishing whether the conduct 
meets the proxies rather than the ultimate question of interest. 









14 United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1115 (10th Cir. 2003). 
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question, courts should simply do the best they can to answer the 
question society ultimately cares about, is the action anti-competitive 
or pro-competitive. Had the Department of Justice been able to focus 
its argument on the actual competitive effects of American Airlines’ 
pricing strategy, rather than how to measure American’s cost, the 
court would have been forced to confront the issues that antitrust law 
is meant to address. 
Many horizontal agreement cases, under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, raise the same issues. While Sagers is surely correct that cases 
such as Apple15 that involve horizontal price fixing or market division 
do not require an elaborate inquiry into the pro- and anti-competitive 
effects, most other cases do. In famous cases, such as Board of Trade 
of Chicago16 or BMI,17 the Court addressed agreements that had a 
superficial similarity to price fixing but whose competitive effects were 
much more complicated. As a result, the Court ruled that per se 
treatment in both cases was inappropriate. Because of the particular 
features of the nature of the restraint on pricing or the product in 
question, the Court held that simply applying the label of price fixing 
to the defendants’ conduct should not end the inquiry. Instead, the 
Court required a more in-depth analysis.  
In many markets, there are plausibly pro-competitive reasons for 
firms to cooperate over some issues. In Board of Trade, for example, 
the existence of the grain exchange itself requires that there be some 
agreements on the rules of the exchange. While one can easily imagine 
that the members of the exchange may have incentives to set anti-
competitive rules that enrich their profits at the expense of others, not 
all rules will have that character. Some rules, such as some of those at 
issue in that case, are necessary to create a thick market (one with 
many traders on both sides) that lowers transaction costs and 
generates price transparency and competition. In BMI, the blanket 
license at issue in this case is a product that could only be created 
through cooperation.18 While there are potential anti-competitive 
effects from that cooperation, it is far from obvious that those anti-
competitive effects are so large as to prohibit the existence of a 





15 United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F.Supp.2d 638, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
16 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917). 
17 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979). 
18 Id. 
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Granted, rule of reason cases are more expensive and harder to 
win than per se cases. But, they can be viable. For example, in the 
NCAA v. Board of Regents19 case, the Court acknowledged that 
collegiate sports do have special features that can justify agreements 
among the competing firms (colleges), but it still found that the 
broadcast limits that the NCAA imposed in that case were clearly anti-
competitive after doing a rule of reason analysis. Even in the Apple 
case, the government made rule of reason and per se arguments and 
the court ruled for the government on both. In fact, this case is 
illustrative of why one of the main arguments in favor of broader per 
se rules is not particularly convincing. In a great many cases, 
particularly important ones, plaintiffs do not only make per se 
arguments, they also make a rule of reason case. In such situations, as 
we saw in Apple, there is really no litigation costs savings from the per 
se rule if the parties are going to litigate the rule of reason case in the 
event they lose the per se case. 
The main point here is that antitrust should not proceed by 
catechism.20 The competitive effects of a great many agreements, 
actions, and restraints depend heavily on their particular features and 
particular features of the product and market in question. This doesn’t 
mean, as the Court pointed out in Maricopa21 that the per se 
prohibition against price fixing has to be re-established for every new 
industry. Rather, it means that courts should carefully evaluate claims 
of plausible pro-competitive effect.  
Of course, Sagers is correct that many of the nuanced theories of 
how certain restraints can be pro-competitive are misused by 
defendants for their own purposes. By the same token, plaintiffs also 
misuse many of the post-Chicago theories of harm as well. This type of 
problem is not unique to antitrust. The fact that parties will misuse or 
mischaracterize legitimate theories of the likely effect of some action 






19 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117-20 
(1984). 
20 Daniel Crane argued as a factual matter that it often does. See Daniel A. Crane, 
Bargaining over Loyalty, 92 TEX. L. REV. 253, 274-75 (2013). This author has argued in 
that context that this is a mistake. See Abraham L. Wickelgren, Detailed Analysis, Not 
Catechism: A Comment on Crane’s Bargaining over Loyalty, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013). 
21 Ariz. v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 349 (1982). 
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Just as in other areas of the law, the role of the courts is not to give 
up and ignore the fact that the world is complicated. The role of the 
court is to sort through the facts and decide upon the outcome that 
provides the best balance of maximizing the deterrence of harmful 
conduct while minimizing the chilling of desirable conduct. To be 
clear, this requires that courts view the arguments on both sides with 
an open mind and do not require any elevated standard of proof for 
either side. Yes, courts will make mistakes, particularly on issues that 
involve difficult economic theories. But, as long as those mistakes are 
not too frequent and (most importantly) relatively hard to predict in 
advance, the incentives the court creates will be reasonably good. On 
the other hand, when courts try to simplify their decision calculus by 
asking the wrong questions, it creates predictable errors that parties 
can exploit in ways that create undesirable incentives in both 
directions. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST AND IRONY 
Just because antitrust is complicated and courts should not avoid 
careful analysis of the economic effects of the restraints at issue 
doesn’t mean that every case is difficult. I completely agree with 
Sagers’s assessment that the Apple case really was just a garden-
variety horizontal price-fixing case. As Sagers shows, once one 
examines the potential pro-competitive claims that Apple and its 
defenders made for its actions, it is quite clear that none of them hold 
water.  
The larger point, however, is that it is easy to come to that 
conclusion without having to also come to the conclusion that the 
economic theories of pro-competitive effects that Apple and its 
defenders attempted to use are generally baseless. Despite the fact 
that Apple was in a vertical relationship with the publishers and had 
contractual provisions that governed the retail price of e-books, the 
Apple case was not really a resale price maintenance case. This means 
that one can agree with much of what Sagers says about the 
publishers, Apple, and the e-books case without having to conclude 
that RPM does not have plausible pro-competitive justifications or 
that the justifications for RPM do not rest on criticisms of market 
competition. 
Sagers mischaracterizes the justifications for RPM when arguing 
that they rest on consumers not knowing what they want by missing a 
subtle, but important, distinction. Many typical arguments for the 
efficiency of RPM do rely on consumers not being perfectly informed 
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about the qualities of the products they are considering, but they do 
not require that consumers do not know the types of attributes they 
would like in a product. Having limited information is not the same as 
being irrational. In fact, given that information is costly, it is perfectly 
rational to not be perfectly informed about all of the products one 
might be interested in purchasing. Given that consumers have limited 
information about a product’s attributes (even though they know what 
attributes they desire), it is often in both the manufacturer’s and the 
consumer’s interest to provide that information to the consumer. The 
key to the pro-competitive argument for RPM is that, at least in some 
situations, the retailer is in the best position to provide that 
information. If that is the case, the retailer must have some incentive 
to bear the cost of providing this information. RPM is one way to 
provide this incentive: by ensuring that the retailer earns positive 
profits on its sales (by preventing other retailers from undercutting its 
price), the retailer can profit from providing information to 
consumers that increases its sales. 
Of course, Sagers is correct that this argument doesn’t necessarily 
make sense. In many cases, the retailer may not be the best source of 
information. Sometimes, the manufacturer may be able to find other 
ways to incentivize the retailer to provide information. But, whether 
either of these is the case will require a case-by-case inquiry. The 
Chicago school’s other point, however, is that in general the 
manufacturer has no incentive to increase retailer profit margin 
unless this somehow stimulates demand for its product. This creates 
some alignment between the interests of the manufacturer and final 
consumer with respect to the behavior of the retailer. Of course, one 
can (and some associated with the Chicago school frequently did) 
push this point too far. For example, the manufacturer wants to 
induce retailer behavior that benefits the marginal consumer—the one 
who it needs to induce to buy the product or pay a higher price—not 
the average consumer. Thus, it is certainly possible for resale price 
maintenance to lead to higher prices so as to induce retailers to 
provide information that induces the marginal consumer to purchase 
the product but make the average consumer worse off because most 
consumers who value the product a great deal did not need that 
information. But, again, this is merely a possibility result. We cannot 
come to any general conclusions that manufacturers use RPM only 
when it is efficient or that it is generally inefficient. There is no way to 
make this determination in any given case with any degree of accuracy 
without a detailed analysis of the situation at hand. 
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Sagers also argues that the justifications for the efficiency of RPM 
are somehow anti-market. This is only true if one takes a very extreme 
view of the role of markets in a market economy. No one who 
advocates for markets thinks that every economic decision should be 
left to markets. When a firm hires an employee, the employee usually 
agrees (within reason) to do what the employer asks for no additional 
compensation for some period of time. Even though the firm could 
just use spot market transactions for every task it needs done, we 
don’t say the use of employment contracts is anti-market. In fact, 
under Sagers position, the entire existence of firms would be an 
argument against markets. And, in some sense, this is correct. 
Markets work wonderfully in many situations, but they are not always 
the best solution to every economic decision. A clerk in a store does 
not have the expertise to decide how much to sell an item for, so no 
one suggests that the store owner should sell the items to the clerk and 
then have the clerk sell them to the customers. Believing that the 
market is still the best way to ultimately allocate these items does not 
require a belief that every step of the production chain has to be 
governed by market transactions. Sometimes contracts work better 
than spot market transactions (that’s why contracts exist). As Coase 
pointed out, contracts can often enable parties to internalize 
externalities that might otherwise lead to inefficient outcomes. The 
argument in favor of RPM is really an argument about using a 
contract to internalize an externality. Without RPM, retailer 
investments in informing consumers were costly to the retailer but 
provided benefits only to the manufacturer. The RPM contract allows 
the retailer to capture some of that benefit, internalizing the 
externality and making the market function better. 
Lastly, the pro-competitive arguments for RPM are not destructive 
competition arguments. These are arguments that competitors use to 
justify horizontal agreements that limit competition between them 
because horizontal competitors always have an interest in reducing 
competition. By contrast, in the baseline case, the manufacturer 
benefits from more competition among its retailers. This competition 
lowers retail profits which enables the manufacturer to retain a higher 
share of the profits from the vertical chain of production. To take a 
simple example, if the manufacturer sells a product that costs five to 
make to a retailer for ten, it will make a profit of five for every item the 
retailer sells. The retailer will sell more items the lower its price, so the 
manufacturer wants the retailer to charge as low a price as possible. 
The fact that a manufacturer is going against this basic interest in 
agreeing to a RPM contract suggests that something more complicated 
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is going on. One does not, however, need to introduce any 
complications to explain why horizontal competitors might want to fix 
prices at a high level. 
Of course, the fact that the pro-competitive arguments for RPM 
are reasonable does not mean they are right in every, or even most, 
cases. Furthermore, even if the pro-competitive arguments are correct 
in a given case, it doesn’t mean there can’t also be anti-competitive 
effects that might outweigh the pro-competitive benefits. RPM can 
help facilitate collusion, either at the retail level or the manufacturer 
level. If retailers can get manufacturers to impose RPM contracts, they 
can effectively support a retailer cartel. While this wouldn’t be in the 
interests of the manufacturer, the more competitive the 
manufacturing market is, the more likely such a cartel would raise 
industry profits and the retail sector could compensate the 
manufacturers for their losses. Alternatively, if manufacturers are 
colluding, then RPM contracts will prevent a cheating manufacturer 
from benefitting from reducing its wholesale price because it won’t be 
able to expand output due to the retail price being set by the RPM 
contract. Even in the absence of collusion, Rey and Verge have shown 
that RPM contracts can enable an industry with a small number of 
manufacturers and retailers to extract higher combined profits than 
they could without using RPM contracts if the manufacturers use the 
same set of retailers.22  
Once again, what all this means is that a robust rule of reason is 
the only way to deter firms from using RPM anti-competitively while 
not chilling their use of RPM in situations where it is pro-competitive. 
Sagers is correct that there is a huge theoretical literature justifying 
almost any questioned conduct under the right circumstances. By the 
same token, however, there is another huge theoretical literature that 
explains how that same conduct can be anti-competitive. While this is 
certainly partly due to self-serving incentives on both sides, it is also 
due to the fact that there is a substantial amount of truth in both 
literatures. RPM, like most other contentious areas of antitrust, is 
contentious precisely because there are good reasons to think it can be 
pro-competitive and good reasons to think it can be anti-competitive. 
The only way to tell which effect is more important in any particular 





22 Patrick Rey & Thibaud Verge, Resale Price Maintenance and Interlocking Relationships, 
58 J. INDUS. ECON. 928, 930 (2010). 
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Contrary to what Sagers suggests, we cannot rely on empirical 
evidence to provide an easy answer that is applicable to all cases. First, 
the empirical evidence on RPM is not nearly as conclusive as Sagers 
claims. MacKay and Smith23 have an excellent discussion of how 
difficult it is to empirically measure the effects of RPM. They explain 
that it can be hard to determine even when RPM exists. One can get 
around this by exploiting changes in the legal environment. But, as 
they point out, changes in the legal environment may be a lagging 
indicator in that a change in the legal treatment of RPM (e.g., a shift 
away from per se illegality) might occur after many actors already 
know that enforcers are pursuing such cases less aggressively because 
they are less hostile to the practice. In addition, because the lowest 
price of a product across retailers is often the modal price, it can be 
hard to distinguish whether a change in price is due to RPM 
enforcement or other factors. Even if one can be confident that the 
effect one has found is attributable to RPM, measuring welfare 
consequences is still very difficult. Just measuring the effect on the 
quantity sold does not definitively identify the welfare effect of RPM.24 
If RPM both increases quality and enables collusion, demand could 
expand while consumer surplus falls as the sellers use RPM to extract 
more of the surplus from high valuing consumers. On the other hand, 
RPM could only increase quality but lead to less demand and still 
potentially increase or decrease consumer welfare or total welfare 
depending on which consumers value the improved quality more.  
Second, even if we were confident that RPM was more often anti-
competitive than pro-competitive, that would not necessarily justify 
per se prohibition. We would need to know something about the 
magnitudes of these effects before even being able to say whether per 
se prohibition were better than per se legality. Even if we were to 
know that RPM generated a net welfare loss, a rule of reason approach 
that was reasonably accurate could easily still generate even more 
welfare by deterring most harmful RPM while not chilling the most 
obviously pro-competitive RPM. 
That said, it is important to emphasize that plaintiffs must have a 
legitimate chance to win rule of reason cases for the rule of reason to 
work effectively. Courts should not use the high cost of defending 





23 Alexander MacKay & David A. Smith, Challenges for Empirical Research on RPM, 50 
REV. INDUS. ORG. 209, 209 (2017). 
24 Id. at 214. 
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get past dismissal or summary judgment (as the Court did in 
Twombly25). Doing so would only encourage more anti-competitive 
conduct and, because of that, might not even save on litigation costs if 
the expansion of anti-competitive conduct means that more plaintiffs 
have very strong cases that have a decent chance of surviving even 
heightened standards for getting past dismissal or summary 
judgement. 
None of this, however, changes the fact that Sagers is 
fundamentally right about the Apple case. While the contracts 
between Apple and the publishers included resale price maintenance 
clauses, that was not the basis of the government’s case against Apple. 
As Sagers says, it was a hub and spoke horizontal price fixing case. 
The publishers wanted to collude to increase the price of e-books, 
Apple knew this and offered to become the hub that would make the 
hub and spoke conspiracy work. The Department of Justice and the 
States all made both a per se price fixing case and a rule of reason case 
and won both of them. While I disagree with Sagers’s implicit claim 
that RPM is not complicated in general, I completely agree with him 
that the Apple case was pretty much a plain vanilla price fixing case 
(full disclosure reminder: I was a consulting expert for the State of 
Texas on this case). Similarly, while I disagree with Sagers’s (implicit) 
suggestion that courts should not take seriously any claim that this 
market is different, he is certainly right that neither Apple nor the 
publishers made any convincing economic case for why the e-book 
market justified any different treatment. Furthermore, as mentioned 
above, while there are cases where particular features of a product or 
market justify different antitrust treatment than in the typical market 
(whatever that is), I fully agree that firms have a strong incentive to 
make this argument whether or not there is any legitimate economic 
basis for it. Sagers is surely correct that technological change can be 
disruptive and existing firms have an incentive to use anti-competitive 
behavior to deter new entrants from stealing their market. 
Fortunately, and not surprisingly, the Apple court was not fooled by 
appeals to preserve the dominance of existing modes of production. 
While courts will sometimes make mistakes, we can expect courts to 
be right frequently enough that we will be worse off if they abdicate 
their responsibility to distinguish harmful from benign competitive 
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